In authoritarian regimes, leaders often secure prolonged control through oppressive tactics that prevent opposition from organizing or gaining momentum. From a game theory perspective, this strategy can be understood as a “fear-based stability,” where the cost of opposition is high, and the risk of repression discourages dissenters from taking action.
In such regimes, individuals face a prisoner's dilemma: although collective action could increase the likelihood of challenging the ruler successfully, the first to oppose often suffers severe consequences if others do not join. This creates a situation where everyone prefers to avoid the risk, maintaining a Nash equilibrium in which silence and compliance are rational choices. This mutual inaction leads to a stable yet coercive equilibrium where the authoritarian’s rule remains unchallenged.
However, during extreme conditions—such as famine, economic collapse, or war—this equilibrium may shift. When basic survival is under threat, the difference between acting and not acting diminishes, as both paths may offer similarly low chances of survival. At this point, rebellion equilibrium can emerge, where the collective desperation motivates more individuals to take action despite the risks.
Authoritarian leaders are therefore keenly aware of the need to prevent crises that push citizens into such a rebellion equilibrium. By maintaining a degree of economic stability and suppressing dissent through fear, they preserve their regime’s authority. Nonetheless, game theory illustrates that in the face of overwhelming hardship, even fear-based stability can break, exposing authoritarian rule to the risk of mass uprising.
独裁体制下
独裁者通过高压手段来防止反对派形成威胁，尤其对敢于公开反对的人进行严厉打击。这种严惩措施不仅能立即消除威胁，还能在群体中形成震慑效应，使得潜在的反对者不敢轻举妄动。
同时独裁者禁止人们参与社会组织，防止人们互助，我们可以用囚徒困境来理解它,类似于防止囚徒们合作。
只有当出现饥荒、经济崩溃、战乱等极端情况时，至少一定数量的人生命直接受到威胁，个人的机会成本和风险权衡发生剧变。此时，选择不反抗也意味着几乎没有生存的希望，因此反抗的代价和不反抗的代价趋于一致。
这也是为什么极权政权会极力避免经济崩溃或民生危机，因为这种危机不仅威胁到统治的稳定，也为反抗的发生创造了条件。