The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency; The second is war. Both bring temporary prosperity, both bring a permanent ruin. But both are the refuge of political and economic opportunists.

A dictator’s decision to wage war is not an impulsive frenzy, but a rational choice made after assessing risks and benefits within their unique power structure and information bubble, leading them to believe that “the benefits outweigh the costs.” Let us delve deeply into this process of “rational calculation,” and why this “rationality” often ultimately leads to destruction.

The Dictator’s “Rational” Calculation: Why War is the “Optimal Solution”?

In a healthy, open society, facing economic contraction and high unemployment, the government has many options in its toolbox: adjusting monetary policy, implementing fiscal stimulus, reforming industrial structure, strengthening social security, encouraging the development of SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises), engaging in international cooperation, and so on.

However, under a dictatorial regime, many options are unfeasible, or rather, the political risk associated with them is unacceptable to the dictator himself:

  1. Genuine Economic Reform? -> Shaking the Foundation of Power.

    • Risk: Deep economic reform inevitably requires breaking the profit monopoly of existing bureaucratic and oligarchic groups, promoting marketization and rule of law. This directly threatens the core interest groups that support the dictator’s power, and might even give rise to civil society forces independent of the government due to deregulation. This is what the dictator fears most. .

  2. Large-Scale Social Welfare? -> Financially Unsustainable and “Codding Laziness.”

    • Risk: During an economic downturn, government fiscal revenue is already reduced, making large-scale welfare distribution difficult to sustain. More importantly, in the dictator’s view, welfare might weaken the public’s obedience, making them “lazy” and less inclined to “contribute to the nation,” so it is better to invest resources in military armament and large-scale projects that can better demonstrate national strength.

  3. Relaxing Social Controls and Encouraging Innovation? -> Creating Instability Factors.

    • Risk: Innovation requires the free flow of ideas and open access to information. For a regime that relies on information blockade and ideological control to maintain stability, this is equivalent to drinking poison to quench thirst. A vibrant, bottom-up innovative environment is the natural enemy of the dictatorial system.

After excluding all the above options for “internal reform,” the “rational” choices left for the dictator are few. At this point, the advantages of “external war” become evident:

  • The only “reform” that doesn’t require touching internal interest groups: War can package all internal contradictions (unemployment, wealth gap, unfair resource distribution) and project them outward through a grand narrative. It does not require cutting into any internal vested interests.
  • The cost is borne by the lowest strata: The price of war—life—is primarily paid by unemployed, proletarian youth. To the high-and-mighty dictator, these are merely statistics, “consumables” used to achieve their grand goals.
  • The benefits are enjoyed solely by the highest level: If the gamble pays off, the territory, resources, prestige, and national pride brought by the war will all be attributed to the dictator’s “wise leadership,” greatly consolidating their personal power and historical status.

Therefore, in a closed decision-making system that has excluded all healthy reform options, war gradually transforms from an extreme, unimaginable option into the only logical, and even “rational,” exit. This is the core reason why figures like Hitler, Saddam, and Carl Thelleri ultimately took this path. They were not mad; they made the “optimal” choice within their own logical framework.

The Paradox of History: Is This True for All Dictators?

Your assertion that “all dictators” choose this path is a very strong claim. Although the temptation of war is immense, there are indeed some counter-examples or “deformed” cases. Some dictators, when facing the same pressures, have chosen other methods, which usually depends on their specific national conditions and geopolitical environment:

  • Choosing “Internal War” — Large-Scale Purges and Repression: When the external military strength disparity is vast, or when the geographical conditions for launching war are unfavorable, some dictators choose to turn violence inward. For example, the Great Purge during the Stalin era was, to some extent, achieved by eliminating “class enemies” and “people’s enemies,” creating terror, diverting social pressure caused by economic failure (such as the disaster of agricultural collectivization), and sending large populations to the Gulag for forced labor, thereby consuming “surplus population” in a non-war form to serve national construction.

  • Choosing “Extreme Infrastructure” — Consuming Resources and Manpower through Large Projects: Some dictators choose to wage a “war against nature,” absorbing unemployed populations and surplus capacity by building extraordinary large dams, canals, palaces, or monuments. This also achieves the effect of “concentrating power to accomplish great things,” uniting the people, and showcasing the leader’s great achievements, but the risk is smaller compared to external war.

  • Choosing “Isolationism” — Completely Cutting Off Contact with the Outside World: In extreme circumstances, if a country lacks the ability to wage war and also lacks the resources for large-scale projects, it may choose complete isolationism, using strict social control and propaganda to make the populace believe they live in “the happiest country in the world,” while the outside world suffers hardship.

Conclusion: The Irresistible Temptation and the Predetermined Outcome

Despite the variations mentioned above, your core observation is correct: Waging war externally is always the highest, most glamorous, and most dangerous option in the dictator’s toolbox when facing a crisis of governance.

It is so tempting because it perfectly aligns with the operational logic of a dictatorial regime: using grand narratives to mask specific problems, using collectivism to suppress individual rights, using external contradictions to shift internal focus, and using violence to achieve political goals.

From Hitler’s attempt to solve Germany’s economic difficulties using “living space,” to Saddam’s attempt to repay the massive debt from the Iran-Iraq War and resolve domestic contradictions by annexing Kuwait, their trajectories clearly confirm this point. They are not ignorant of the risks of war; rather, in their “rational calculation,” the benefits of maintaining power outweigh the risk of defeat—or, put another way, the risk of letting internal crises erupt without war is greater than the risk of waging war.